London, 9 October 2026 — EBM Newsdesk Analysis — By Brad Adams
A Kremlin-backed sanctions-evasion network used a London fintech to make payments, the Financial Times reports. A forged invoice made it look as though the company, which is registered with the Financial Conduct Authority, was supplying the A7 network with “cashmere sewing fabric”. The FT’s report doesn’t make clear whether the fintech knew who it was dealing with. The case shows how easily Russia’s shadow payment system can use Britain’s financial system without being noticed.
The FT’s revelation follows a month of disclosures about A7. Last month the FT reported, based on hundreds of thousands of leaked files, that the network had moved more than $6.9bn through global banks, including Standard Chartered, First Abu Dhabi Bank, Citigroup and Deutsche Bank. On 1 October, the US Treasury’s financial crime unit, FinCEN, issued an alert saying entities linked to A7’s ruble-backed stablecoin had processed at least $179bn between February 2025 and June 2026.
What A7 Is
A7 was set up in late 2024 to keep Russian trade flowing after Russian banks were cut off from SWIFT. It is co-owned by Promsvyazbank, a sanctioned state lender closely tied to Russia’s military, and by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan businessman convicted in 2014 over a fraud in which about $1bn was taken from Moldovan banks. The US, UK and EU have all sanctioned it.
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SubscribeThe method is simple and effective. A7 sets up front companies in places such as the UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Hong Kong and Hungary and opens accounts with respectable banks. When a compliance team questions a payment, A7 produces paperwork: invoices, customs codes and descriptions of goods. FinCEN says some of those documents were altered using AI. According to FinCEN, the network had accounts at about 435 financial institutions in at least 83 countries.
Why London Is Exposed
London is one of the world’s biggest fintech centres. Hundreds of FCA-registered companies offer payment services, foreign exchange and business accounts. Many of them grew fast with small compliance teams, and payment firms often rely on the bank sending the money to check its own customers. A7’s operators know this.
Invoices are the weak point. A compliance analyst checking thousands of transactions can’t verify every invoice for fabric, machine parts or electronics. FinCEN’s warning signs include unusual invoice templates, unrealistic prices, physical company stamps on digital documents and Cyrillic text appearing where it shouldn’t. These are things a busy team can easily miss.
It matters for the sector as a whole. Fintechs such as Revolut want to be seen as full banks, and that means being judged by banking standards on financial crime. As organised criminal networks adopt AI tools, firms need specialist financial crime expertise rather than more junior staff working through checklists.
The Gulf Connection
Many of A7’s front companies are in the UAE. First Abu Dhabi Bank says it has identified and closed the accounts involved. The UAE has worked hard to leave the international watchlist for financial crime and to attract Gulf investment into Europe. Revelations like these show how much it still has to prove.
Where This Goes
The FCA will want to know which firm was involved, what checks it carried out and why it didn’t spot the invoices. Other London fintechs should assume they could be targeted and review their payment flows against FinCEN’s warning signs now.
The bigger lesson is that sanctions only work if every bank and fintech that handles the payments is properly checking them. A7 depends on finding gaps in that system. If the first weak point is in London, Britain is more exposed than its regulators would like to believe.
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