Masrour Barzani’s Political Crisis Could Send Another Wave of Kurds Towards Europe

After years of confrontational leadership, Masrour Barzani faces growing criticism over a political crisis that threatens Iraqi Kurdistan’s economy and could push more people towards Europe.

Europe should be watching Erbil. The political crisis engulfing Iraqi Kurdistan could have consequences far beyond Iraq, potentially pushing another generation of young people towards Europe in search of jobs, security and a future they no longer believe they can build at home.

At the centre of this crisis is Masrour Barzani. As Prime Minister since 2019, he has had years to strengthen the region’s institutions, reconcile its rival political factions and create the conditions for a more stable economy. Instead, his premiership has been marked by an increasingly confrontational relationship with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), prolonged political paralysis and now the prospect of competing administrations. The divisions he inherited are real, but after years in the highest office, Barzani must answer for what he has done to resolve them.

The consequences could extend to Europe’s borders. Thousands of people from Iraqi Kurdistan are already leaving in search of better opportunities. A local refugee association estimated that approximately 6,500 people migrated abroad during 2025, with at least 11 dying on dangerous journeys. If the region’s economic conditions deteriorate further, that outward movement could accelerate. Europe, already dealing with the consequences of instability elsewhere in the Middle East, should not underestimate the risk.

The KDP and PUK have competed for power for decades, maintaining separate political networks and, for much of that time, separate security structures. Their administrations were formally reunified in 2006, but the divisions never truly disappeared. Barzani inherited this fractured system. What matters now is that he has been Prime Minister for seven years, with the authority and opportunity to make meaningful progress towards a unified government. The continued failure to do so is a central part of his political record.

The October 2024 election offered a clear opportunity for a settlement. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won 39 seats, making it the largest single party, but without a majority. The PUK secured 23 seats and the New Generation Movement 15. By joining forces, the two created a 38-seat parliamentary bloc, just one seat behind the KDP. Barzani could claim the strongest single-party result, but he could not reasonably ignore a parliamentary alliance almost equal in size to his own party.

Nearly two years later, no new regional government had been formed. Negotiations over senior appointments and the distribution of authority repeatedly stalled. The KDP accused the PUK of obstructing government formation, while the PUK accused the KDP of seeking to monopolise power. The PUK bears responsibility for its negotiating decisions, but Barzani was not a detached observer. He was the Prime Minister responsible for leading the government and finding a political arrangement that could command sufficient support. The failure to reach one happened on his watch.

The crisis escalated on November 4, when the KDP pushed ahead with a parliamentary session despite the PUK and New Generation boycott. Fifty-two members attended, meeting the quorum in the 100-seat chamber. Six lawmakers elected on PUK and New Generation lists attended despite their parties’ position. Bafel Talabani subsequently accused the KDP of using public money to bribe or threaten parliamentarians into participating. Those allegations remain unproven, and the KDP defended the session as lawful. But the political fallout was immediate: the PUK announced its withdrawal from the regional government and threatened to establish a separate administration.

Barzani’s decision to proceed without securing a broader political settlement has become another defining moment in his premiership. A parliamentary session may satisfy procedural requirements, but it cannot by itself resolve a crisis of political legitimacy and trust. The result has been further confrontation, with the possibility of a divided administration becoming more real.

For the region’s population, this is not an abstract argument about parliamentary procedure. Iraqi Kurdistan remains heavily dependent on public spending and oil revenues. Disputes with Baghdad over federal budget transfers and oil exports have repeatedly disrupted salaries for public-sector employees. When salaries are delayed, businesses lose customers, projects are suspended and families struggle to plan their futures. The regional government has reported substantial shortfalls in federal funding and stalled development projects.

Barzani cannot control every decision made in Baghdad, but he can control whether Kurdistan presents a united front. A divided Kurdish leadership has less leverage in negotiations over budgets, oil revenues and customs arrangements. It is also less capable of attracting investment or pursuing the economic diversification needed to create jobs beyond the public sector. These are precisely the areas where a functioning regional government should be providing leadership.

The immigration implications are becoming harder to ignore. Young Kurds are not leaving simply because they want to experience life abroad. Many see little prospect of finding secure employment, building a business or enjoying a predictable future at home. When investment retreats, public finances remain uncertain and political disputes dominate government, the incentive to leave becomes stronger. Barzani’s critics can reasonably ask what his years in office have delivered to a generation increasingly looking outside Kurdistan for opportunity.

The 2021 Belarus border crisis offered a glimpse of what happens when large numbers of Iraqi Kurds attempt to reach the European Union. Thousands became stranded on the Belarusian-Polish border after travelling along an organised migration route. People from the Kurdistan Region have continued to seek routes into Europe, often through smugglers and at considerable personal risk.

A further deterioration in Kurdistan’s economy could intensify this movement. Kurdistan would lose skilled workers, graduates and entrepreneurs who should be building its next generation of businesses. European countries could face additional pressure on asylum systems, housing, public services and border authorities. More people could also risk their lives on dangerous routes across the Mediterranean.

The crisis threatens the region’s wider international position as well. Turkey and Iran have substantial interests in northern Iraq, and a divided Kurdish leadership gives neighbouring powers greater room to exert influence. Western governments, which have invested in security cooperation with the Peshmerga and partnerships against Islamic State, also have reason to be concerned. Political fragmentation makes Kurdistan a less reliable partner and a more difficult destination for international investment.

The lesson of the 2017 independence referendum was that Kurdish aspirations could not be sustained without internal cohesion and international support. The subsequent loss of Kirkuk exposed how quickly political gains could be reversed when Kurdish leaders were divided. Today, autonomy could be weakened gradually as Baghdad gains financial leverage and regional institutions lose authority.

Barzani’s supporters will point to the KDP’s 39 seats and argue that the party has the strongest electoral mandate. That is true. But it is not a majority, and it does not absolve the Prime Minister of the responsibility to negotiate. The PUK must also answer for its withdrawal and threat of a parallel administration. Yet the central question remains what Barzani has done with the authority entrusted to him since 2019. He cannot claim the achievements of the premiership while distancing himself from its political failures.

Europe should not wait until another wave of people is attempting to cross its borders before taking this crisis seriously. Iraqi Kurdistan has been a source of relative stability in a difficult region. If Barzani’s political approach continues to deepen divisions and undermine economic confidence, Kurdish families will pay the first price. But the consequences may soon be visible in European cities, asylum centres and border crossings.

The next immigration crisis may not begin where European policymakers expect. Some of its warning signs are already visible in Erbil, and Barzani will have to answer for the choices that helped bring the region here.