Europe’s Critical Minerals Race Heats Up as Green Transition Faces Geopolitical Risk

The European Commission announced its RESourceEU Action Plan in December, 2025, committing €3.5 billion in funding to critical raw material (CRM) projects. By Anna Dodd.

Citing risky dependencies on China, the European Commission aims to have Europe and its allies gaining control over CRM projects across the supply chain. China has long dominated the CRM pipeline – from extraction to processing to manufacturing of final products – which poses a risk to Europe’s energy transition goals. But, the Asian superpower has also shined in military security — a salient subject in recent years.

The past year saw China restrict exports on a range of critical minerals and rare earths — first in April 2025, and then again in October 2025. Although these restrictions were mainly implemented in response to United States tariffs under President Donald Trump, the impacts of Chinese restrictions were felt globally, including within the European Union. 

“[China’s] stronghold creates dependencies for the EU and other partners that are increasingly weaponised for geopolitical purposes,” reads a European Commission communication.

From raw materials to critical raw materials

There was a time when these resources were simply that — resources. When did raw materials like copper, rare earths, and magnesium gain the qualifier of “critical”? 

Henry Sanderson, a journalist and author specializing in clean energy and critical minerals, credited Trump as a major player in the global focus towards critical raw materials, dating back to 2017. 

Although the EU released its first raw materials list in 2011, “Trump really catalyzed this focus on critical minerals in his first administration,” said Sanderson, while in conversation with European Business Magazine. The author pointed to a 2017 executive order which called on the US Department of Commerce to develop a critical minerals federal strategy. 

“But it didn’t receive the global attention that it probably should have done at the time.”

Having campaigned under an anti-renewables stance, Trump’s focus on these materials rather stems from his long-held opposition to American reliance on foreign imports, according to Sanderson. But China’s retaliatory measures on U.S. tariffs last year is what has brought renewed attention to this subject more recently.

“I think that highlights some of the weaknesses of [western] democracies — they wait for issues to bubble up till they reach crisis mode, and then they take action,” he said. “But certainly for Trump, since his first time around, he’s been focused on critical minerals.” 

A renewed view on European security

According to the Commission, critical raw materials are essential for a number of geopolitical priorities: clean energy, digital transitions, food security, and defense and aerospace.

A legal expert specializing in corporate energy and mining regulation noted that the narrative surrounding critical raw materials has transformed in recent years.

“Rearmement and massive investments in defense will likely spillover into critical minerals,” said the expert, choosing to remain anonymous for privacy reasons. 

“Much of the infrastructure that is needed for defense, like drones, AI systems, radar and missile guidance — it’s quite metals-intensive and power hungry … If Europe is really serious about rearming and reinforcing its strategic autonomy, it cannot do so while remaining reliant on Chinese electric vehicle batteries and rare earth magnets.” 

But before EU security and military returned to mainstream geopolitical discussions, critical raw materials had already been identified as strategic for the green energy transition. 

The expert observed this change: “What concerns me professionally is that the energy transition is not fueling this trend anymore. Yes, rare earth and battery metals are kind of like the new oil, but resource control itself is the new bargaining power,” he said.

“The question is whether democracies can build secure, ethical, and competitive supply chains fast enough and without resorting to the same extractive zero-sum game they claim to oppose.”

The European stake 

Where countries like the United States and China have been in the critical raw materials business for some time now, the European Union has been late to join. China has been particularly active in Africa, not only taking a leading role in critical raw materials mining, but also investing substantially in various infrastructure projects through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

Eszter Szedlacsek is a climate policy expert with Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and research fellow with the Africa Policy Research Institute. She highlighted that comparing China’s influence in Africa to the European Union’s is difficult. 

Under the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), several bilateral partnerships in Africa are outlined. “But these are quite opaque,” said Szedlacsek. “So their success and whatever impact they have and however they can compete with the Chinese influence really depends on how they will be implemented.” 

And although the strategic projects in Africa outlined in the CRMA are much more concrete, they are minimal in comparison to China. “Four projects in the entire African continent, it’s not too extensive,” said Szedlacsek, adding, however, that the EU brings its own unique value.

“How the EU tries to differentiate itself is through local value addition, supporting industrialization locally in African countries,” she said.

Similarly, Arthur Leichthammer, a policy fellow for geoeconomics at the Jacques Delors Centre, added that price is not the only consideration when it comes to competition with China. “They’re not competing on price,” he said. “You will not compete on price.” 

Other factors come into play, such as ensuring a safe and reliable trading partner. 

“There are resilience criteria that must be priced in,” said Leichthammer. “If you would assume a frictionless trade, you would just keep on buying from China … you will not be able to rely on China for continuous supply.” 

Cooperating with the United States

In spite of Trump’s recent rhetoric surrounding Greenland and the possibility of a U.S. acquisition – which was met with widespread European opposition – the American government indicated a more collaborative attitude at its February 4, 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial, seemingly reframing the country’s approach to international relations — at least on the subject of critical raw materials. 

“Today the United States, together with our partners and allies, has set out to reshape the global market for critical minerals and rare earths,” reads the government communication. 

Echoing similar statements from the RESourceEU Action Plan, the U.S. government announced collaboration with over 50 countries, as well as the European Commission. 

“The [critical minerals and rare earths market] is highly concentrated, leaving it a tool of political coercion and supply chain disruption, putting our core interests at risk. We will build new sources of supply, foster secure and reliable transport and logistics networks, and transform the global market into one that is secure, diversified, and resilient, end-to-end.” 

In a joint press statement, the nature of the collaboration between the European Commission and the United States is explained in further detail. Within the next 30 days, a Memorandum of Understanding “aimed at boosting critical minerals supply chain security” will be signed between the two parties.  

What this collaboration means for critical raw materials development in Greenland, demonopolizing China’s role within the market, and the EU’s RESourceEU Action Plan has yet to be seen.